

June 29, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A3425

The U.N. is an extremely worthwhile organization. Its peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts are a blessing to all mankind. This organization deserves and, I hope, will continue to receive our solid and everlasting support.

Tribute to Hon. Douglas Dillon, Former Secretary of the Treasury

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. SEYMOUR HALPERN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 29, 1965

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, on June 21 I was privileged to attend a luncheon honoring former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon. It was a small luncheon attended by the officers and friends of the Inter-American Development Bank at its offices here in Washington.

I have long admired the work and objectives of the IDB and have been privileged to serve as a congressional adviser to the U.S. delegation at various meetings of the Board of Governors of the Bank.

The role Douglas Dillon has played as the U.S. representative on this Board of Governors will long be remembered. He has been a pillar of strength in this remarkable undertaking and is largely responsible for the great success the IDB has enjoyed. He has not only helped to set the Bank on a sound foundation, but has helped to chart its steady course in the years to come.

A most significant tribute was paid to Secretary Dillon at this luncheon by Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development Bank—one which, I feel, has such importance that it should be brought to the attention of the Members of this House since we, the Members of Congress, must make the ultimate determinations in regard to the U.S. participation in this endeavor. I know of no finer justification for our role than that reflected in the following remarks of President Herrera concerning our great former Secretary of the Treasury:

REMARKS OF FELIPE HERRERA, PRESIDENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AT A CEREMONY HONORING FORMER U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY DOUGLAS DILLON, WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 21, 1965

In honoring Douglas Dillon today for his extraordinary service and devotion to the cause of inter-American economic cooperation, we must perforce remember the last 8 years—a period marked by the germination, the establishment and the growth of the Inter-American Development Bank.

The economic conference of the OAS held in August 1957, in Buenos Aires, was a significant landmark in the interesting and constructive process of providing the inter-American system with a structure to foster Latin America's development, welfare and stability. At that Conference, Douglas Dillon, then just recently named to a high State Department position after having served as U.S. Ambassador to France, began his long association with Latin American affairs.

I might venture to recall, that in those days when I headed by country's delegation to that meeting, Mr. Dillon whom I first met on that occasion told me that he was deeply impressed by the interest shown by Latin America in the creation of a regional financial organization and also by the vigor with which that idea was being put forth. He added that although the U.S. Government was not in a position to adopt a final decision at that time, it was fully prepared to explore, along with the other countries, the feasibility and the perspectives of such an institution.

Just 1 year later, in August 1958, our honored guest, then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, voiced the historic announcement, at a meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, that the Eisenhower administration was prepared to enter into negotiations with the countries of Latin America for the creation of a regional development bank.

The year 1959 was thus an interesting period in which high officials of the United States and of the Latin American countries, many of them present at this ceremony, dedicated their maximum efforts to the preparation of a basic charter for an Inter-American Bank and to the ratification of that charter by the end of the year.

In February 1960, in San Salvador, the Bank initiated its organizational process. Little more than 5 years have passed since that time. But, for those of us connected with the Bank, those years have been marked by an intensity that cannot be measured by the mere passage of time.

In the initial period of our institution, Mr. Dillon, now not only a high State Department official, but also an Alternate Governor of the Bank, played an active role and demonstrated particular devotion to the task of putting into effect the project to which he had given so much support.

Just as the Bank prepared to open its doors in mid-1960, the "Declaration of Newport" was issued, followed by the call for the Conference of Bogota, the meeting at which new and dynamic steps were taken to promote hemispheric cooperation. In the Act of Bogota, the American republics recognized for the first time that the peoples' welfare and not just economic development should be an object of common concern. For this, reforms in traditional systems of production and distribution of wealth were needed; local resources had to be oriented on more efficient and social terms, and such efforts had to be complemented with external cooperation. Once more it fell to the lot of Douglas Dillon to express the support of his Government to this new dimension in regional relations and also to champion the plan to entrust a substantial part of the Inter-American Social Development Fund, approved at that meeting, to our new Bank.

This far-reaching decision enabled the Bank, practically from the start of its activities, to finance not only traditional requirements but also those connected with the fields of urban development and sanitation, of rural reform and of higher education. At this juncture, the Bank extended its first loan in February 1961, and symbolically it was one for potable water for the inhabitants and industries of the city of Arequipa, in southern Peru.

At that time, Douglas Dillon had just been named Secretary of the Treasury in the new Kennedy administration and in that capacity he became the U.S. Governor of our Bank. It is unnecessary to describe the full extent of the close association of our honored guest with the Bank in that position. I should like to recall, however, the inspiration of his presence and his speeches at the meetings of our Board of Governors; his lucid statements before the U.S. Congress every time the Bank's resources

were being replenished; his daily intimate contact with the small and large problems of our organization. At times of tension, or of exaggerated concern, in the difficult stage when this multinational Bank was building its financial resources and placing its funds and when it was putting into effect new financial techniques and procedures, Douglas Dillon represented for us, the presence of an objective and true friend, of a banker of great experience, and of a statesman with a clear vision of international economic and political relations.

It fell also to Mr. Dillon's lot during this period to negotiate and sign in the name of his country the Charter of Punta del Este, the institutional framework of the policy of the Alliance for Progress: a document which despite ups and downs in hemispheric relations must be considered the cornerstone in the long process in which a modern society is being created for more than 200 million Latin Americans.

Not only through his imaginative and realistic ideas, but also through that approach which is so typically his, in which firmness is blended with persuasion, intelligence with humanity, and tact with conviction, Douglas Dillon projected and reaffirmed certain basic concepts for international economic and financial cooperation. These concepts, I am happy and proud to recognize, are part of the Inter-American Development Banks' very own philosophy.

He has been a promoter of the multilateral approach in the field of external financial assistance at both the international and regional scale.

He envisaged, as banker and as man of Government, the possibilities of using sound and well-conceived financial mechanisms, for the needs of economic and social progress in developing countries.

He has been a convinced advocate of the need for the countries south of the Rio Grande not only to develop at a vigorous pace at the national level but also to seek to complement and coordinate their development so that the western world might be able to rely on a strong, prosperous, and united Latin America.

Our bank fully participates in this approach. We are a multilateral organization, and above all we seek to permanently create a philosophy of respect and solidarity among nations of differing rates of development and with differing sociological and political structures. We are struggling, jointly with the governments of Latin America, in an effort to have our funds act as leaven in the necessary task of increasing investment levels in order to create higher standards of living. We have been demonstrating to the developed countries which contribute to our financial resources and to the nations which use our funds that an approach which is technically rigorous and financially sound is not incompatible with the growing and flexible needs of new countries.

This philosophy, of which we think the Bank has been a vivid demonstration, and of which Mr. Dillon has been one of the most important champions, has been reflected in recent times in other areas of the underdeveloped world. Thus, it has not been mere chance that in the creation of the African Development Bank and in the proposal to create a regional bank for Asia, the countries of those continents should have had such a profound interest in the achievements of this regional financial agency for Latin America, which has led us to give technical cooperation for both initiatives.

Esteemed friend Douglas Dillon, in the name of the Board of Executive Directors of the Inter-American Development Bank, its management and staff and as your friend and collaborator, it is a particular pleasure for me to present you with this medal and diploma.

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I sincerely hope that this award will always serve to remind you that all of us at the Bank recognize in your selfless and dedicated services to the Americas, the brilliant reflections of a true statesman.

A Balanced Budget in a Balanced Economy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. RODNEY M. LOVE

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 29, 1965

Mr. LOVE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the President signed into law the bill setting a new temporary national debt limit of \$328 billion. This new limit is \$4 billion above the ceiling that expires tomorrow, June 30, reflecting continuing deficit operations by the Government.

I regret that I could not support this measure with a clear conscience. I felt the necessity of making a strong protest and the only way to do so was to vote against the bill when it was before the House.

I am dedicated to fiscal responsibility and to the prospect of a balanced budget in a balanced economy, as is the administration. The fact is that the Democratic platform, adopted by the Democratic National Committee for 1964, reads as follows:

It is the national purpose, and our commitment, to continue this expansion of the American economy toward its potential, without a recession, with continued stability, and with an extension of the benefits of this growth and prosperity to those who have not fully shared in them.

This will require continuation of flexible and innovative fiscal, monetary and debt management policies, recognizing the importance of low interest rates.

Every penny of Federal spending must be accounted for in terms of the strictest economy, efficiency and integrity. We pledge to continue a frugal government, getting a dollar's value for a dollar spent and a government worthy of the citizen's confidence.

Our goal is a balanced budget in a balanced economy.

The administration has been showing great responsibility in this area. A former Secretary of the Treasury stated that the Department's goal of a balanced budget may be reached by fiscal year 1968. However, enough has not been done and the constant raising of the debt ceiling is not in line with the philosophy expressed in the Democratic Party platform.

While I was very much aware of the problems facing the Treasury Department by reason of Government spending in fiscal year 1965, I used this occasion to raise the red flag for the benefit of any of my colleagues or constituents who were interested in showing that this constant spending beyond our estimated receipts must be halted sometime within the near future if our party is to fulfill its promises of sound fiscal policies in the operation of the Government.

For some time I have felt very much

like many of my constituents—that repeated raises in the debt ceiling avoid the question. We are postponing the inevitable. A balanced budget is a must, sometimes. I am for making a beginning.

In conclusion, it might be considered apropos today to repeat the thoughts of Thomas Jefferson on this subject:

I place economy among the most important virtues and public debt as the greatest of dangers to be feared. To preserve our independence, we must not let our rulers load us up with perpetual debt. We must make our choice between economy and liberty, or proflusion and servitude.

Although we are living in an urbanized economy, in a period of our country's growth much more complicated than the early one of Jefferson, I believe his words are worthy of some reflection, even today.

WH DR Morse
Our Good Neighbors Should Come First

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 28, 1965

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, one of the most thoughtful and perceptive articles on the nature of United States-Latin American relations appeared in the New York Times magazine on June 6, 1965. Written by Dr. John Plank, a noted Latin American specialist who has served in the State Department and on the faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the article comes to grips with the conflicting strands of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

Dr. Plank, who is now on the senior staff at Brookings Institution, points out that there is an inherent dichotomy in viewing Latin America as a "good neighbor" and as a battleground in the cold war. Because we have not resolved this conflict, he argues that we have misjudged the nature of the social and economic revolution and possibly forfeited the respect of an entire generation of Latin Americans.

Dr. Plank suggests that the United States must temper a legitimate concern with the development of Communist strength in the Western Hemisphere with confidence in the independence and devotion to freedom of our Latin American friends.

Although I do not agree with Dr. Plank in every particular, I would like to make his fine article available to all of my colleagues in the House by inserting it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

OUR GOOD NEIGHBORS SHOULD COME FIRST

(By John Plank)

(NOTE.—John Plank is a former Foreign Service officer and professor of Latin American affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is now on the senior staff at the Brookings Institution.)

We cannot yet reckon fully the costs to us of sudden, unilateral military intervention in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. We are obliged, however, on the basis of what we do know to look again at the Latin American policy of the United States. What are its

principles, its premises and assumptions, its goals and priorities?

Such questions need urgently to be considered. Our Government's Dominican actions have caused concern among responsible citizens throughout the hemisphere, many of whom think they see in those actions signs of a partial return to a policy believed to have been superseded years ago. That policy was characterized by a thinly veiled contempt for the Latin Americans, self-arrogation to the United States of responsibility for determining the hemisphere's destinies, and a too-ready disposition to rely on our Armed Forces in defense of our hemispheric interests. A cloud of suspicion and doubt, confusion and bewilderment, now hangs over the region. Honest dialog between the two Americas and true inter-American cooperation, never frequent or easy, have been made much more difficult by our Dominican intervention.

The possibility of a tragic miscalculation of the Dominican kind—a miscalculation, evidently traceable to faulty reporting from our embassy personnel and others in Santo Domingo—has been a real and present danger for more than a decade, ever since the onset of the cold war in Latin America.

Since the 1950's our Latin American policy has been marked by an awkward if unavoidable dualism. One strand of policy has run from the era of the good neighbor and the traditions, myths, customs, and institutions of the inter-American system. To the extent that this strand has informed policy decisions, the states of Latin America have been regarded as standing in a special familial relation to us. They, while weaker than we and much less successful, are entitled to our full respect. Their integrity, independence, and sovereign equality with us are, at almost all costs, to be safeguarded, not only against threats and incursions from outside the hemisphere but also against untoward manifestations of our own vast power. Every appropriate effort is to be made to help our Latin American neighbors translate their juridical equality with us into effective equality in respects—political, economic, and social.

The other strand of policy, which is not really compatible with the former one, derives from our conception of Latin America as an active theater in the cold war, one of the battlegrounds on which we engage those whom we have identified as our mortal enemies, the Communists. In Latin America, as in Asia, Africa, and Europe, our national survival is seen ultimately to be at stake.

Those in our Government who are charged with responsibility for our Latin American policy find themselves in an extraordinarily difficult situation. In effect, they are required to approach Latin America with split vision, and the Latin America that appears under the good neighbor perspective is not the Latin America that appears under the cold war perspective.

The consequences of this duality of approach are manifested in all aspects of our official dealings with Latin America: political, military, economic, social, even cultural. No decision respecting Latin America is taken without some weighing of good neighbor considerations against cold war ones. Because of the different natures of the policy criteria, ambiguity in our Latin American policy decisions is inevitable.

Is a leading Latin American intellectual to be invited to the United States and encouraged to meet with North Americans, or is he to be denied a visa because of his failure to pass a stringent political test administered by a cautious consular officer? Is military assistance to a despotic regime to be curtailed because it is known that the regime maintains itself in power only through the use or threat of force; or is such assistance to be continued because the despot and his armed henchmen have been ferocious, if fre-

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quently overzealous and unsophisticated, battlers against the Communists? Is economic aid to be given to a country because of the country's desire to develop and our recognition of the crying needs of its people; or is it to be withheld because of doubts about the depths of commitment of the country's political leaders to our side in the cold war?

Although both kinds of criteria continue to be employed, it seems evident that during recent times cold war considerations have weighed ever more heavily in the scales of judgment. That this should be the case is understandable. The cold war completely overshadows all other concerns in our global foreign policy. Moreover, the cold war in this hemisphere is becoming more intense and has, since 1959 and Castro's appearance, taken on increasingly a paramilitary cast.

Also, it is not surprising that our overworked officials, burdened with heavy responsibilities and harried by the press and Congress, should want to simplify their decision-making process by greater and greater subordination of good neighbor factors to cold war ones. They can accomplish this subordination by assuming that good neighbor policy and cold war policy are strictly congruent. As time passes they will come to believe that. Some of them undoubtedly already do so.

We shall pay much for such subordination, however, and we should consider carefully whether it is worth its cost. Our Dominican disaster, for example, and its unfortunate hemispheric repercussions, are largely accountable to an overemphasis on cold war criteria, almost to the exclusion of criteria of other sorts. If our interest in a given country is focused heavily on the question of Communist capabilities and prospects, if a disproportionate number of questions put by Washington to our missions in the field, whether bearing on matters political, economic, social, or military, are to be answered with the Communist/non-Communist dichotomy at the forefront of attention, then our understanding of that country is going to be seriously biased. The ferment of change in Latin America today should not be evaluated in cold war terms.

There is another, more serious consequence of weighting cold war factors too heavily in devising Latin American policy. It is that we shall alienate increasing numbers of Latin Americans and shall forfeit much of our small capital of trust and confidence so painfully and haltingly acquired during the past 30 years.

If, for instance, the Alliance for Progress comes widely to be believed in Latin America to be nothing more than a weapon in our cold war arsenal, the Alliance for Progress will die. The formal machinery of the Alliance will persist, of course, but the business transacted under its aegis will be disguised blackmail operations on the Latin American side and disguised bribery or payoff on our own. The spirit, the mystique, the challenge of the Alliance will disappear—and with them our best hope for building an effective inter-American community.

What must be stressed is that the Latin Americans think of themselves as people, not as objects at stake in a global conflict. They think of their states as societies in search of individual national identities and destinies, not as pieces of inhabited territory to be allocated to one side or the other in the cold war. Under the good neighbor perspective, these aspects of the Latin American reality are recognized; under the cold war perspective they are not, except derivatively and expedientially.

We must not allow the cold war to elide or absorb the good neighbor. The latter antedates the former and is a more comprehensive and profound expression of our best long-range interests. In striking the balance between the demands imposed by the

one and those imposed by the other, knowledge, counts for more than doctrine, understanding for more than fervor, judgment for more than determination, and prudence for more than might.

It is tempting to speculate on how different might have been the course of our relations with Latin America had we chosen in 1945 to announce our willingness to give positive content to the good-neighbor policy through a program analogous to the Alliance for Progress. Had we done so, and had we moved with energy and good will to implement the program, the impact of the cold war upon the hemisphere and upon our Latin American policy would have been very different. For we should have initiated our program at a time of exceptional inter-American harmony and we might well have captured the momentum of inter-American cooperation acquired during the Second World War.

Moreover, we would have had a crucial margin of time, several years, in which to help Latin America prepare itself for the revolution of expectations and to establish firmly our identification with the forces of constructive, responsible, democratic reform.

This speculation is useful only because it serves to point up how very different was the policy we actually followed, which was until recently one of comparative neglect of the region. Although alert to the more obvious cold war threats in the hemisphere (we moved expeditiously to prevent a Communist takeover of Guatemala in 1954), and although not unsympathetic to the restless strivings of most people in the area for fundamental changes in their own status and in the traditionally sanctioned order of their societies, we devoted little time and few resources to Latin America.

On the basis of periodic reassurances to ourselves that there existed in the region an immense reservoir of goodwill toward the United States we relegated Latin America to the lowest priority among the major areas of the world. Busy confronting the Communists elsewhere, busy building new alliances and bolstering old ones, we regarded Latin America as something of a nuisance. What we wanted in the hemisphere above all else was quiet. We did not want our attention diverted from our other more important tasks.

The decade 1948-58 was a crucial one for Latin America. The region's great masses, urban and rural, bestirred themselves and began to make demands—political, economic, and social—that they had not made earlier and that the established order simply could not meet. The intellectuals, the professionals, the students, toyed with alternative modes of political and social organization. Nationalism, often strident and xenophobic, came increasingly to serve the purposes of Latin American demagogues.

Democratic regimes were sorely tried; the more fragile of them collapsed into dictatorships. The possibility of mass violence became ever more real: It is symbolic that the decade began in the year of the devastating Bogotá riots and ended in the year that Vice President Nixon was attacked in Lima and Caracas. Fidel Castro is reported to have been in Bogotá in 1948; we know where he was in 1958.

Where was the United States? Was it energetically, wholeheartedly, and constructively helping the Latin Americans to solve their economic and social problems? Was it identified in the minds of Latin America's young people with the forces of responsible but major change? Did the United States, through its actions in that decade, give those young people reason automatically to cast their lot with it in the global struggle against communism? The questions are rhetorical.

Young people do not stay young; a person 20 years old in 1948 was 30 in 1958; he is 37 today. The United States, through

negligence rather than design, nearly forfeited a generation of Latin Americans.

That it did not altogether forfeit them is due to the tardy recognition by the Eisenhower administration that the "immense reservoir of goodwill" was rapidly drying up. More important, it is due to the sensitivity and vision of President Kennedy, who captured the imagination of Latin Americans as no other U.S. President, except Lincoln, has done and who, through his announcement of the Alliance for Progress, put the United States squarely on the side of profound reform in Latin America.

President Kennedy's Latin American policy combined, as deftly as two such incongruent elements can be combined, the good neighbor and the cold war. Both weighed heavily in all his Latin American decisions. Some among us criticized him for the inconclusiveness of his actions against Castro, but the President was not to be pushed into behavior that would jeopardize, perhaps destroy, the developing climate of inter-American trust and cooperation. When the introduction of missiles directly threatened our vital national interests, he moved forcefully, but that threat absent, he acted with masterful restraint.

Some Latin Americans criticized him for making assistance under the Alliance for Progress contingent upon the carrying out of difficult reforms, but the President, relating the Alliance for Progress to the cold war, judged that only by undergoing profound and painful change could the societies of Latin America acquire the inner coherence, the national consensus, that would make possible their withstanding, over the long term, Communist subversion and aggression.

There was, of course, a personal dimension of President Kennedy's Latin American behavior that transcended policy matters as such, one that must be taken into account in assessing his performance. He conveyed to the Latin Americans, as his predecessors had not done, that he understood and sympathized with them, that their problems were his problems. Responsible democratic and reformist Latin Americans felt that in President Kennedy they had a champion.

President Johnson inherited President Kennedy's Latin American problems and program. What he did not and could not inherit was the special trust and confidence invested in President Kennedy by the Latin Americans. That trust and confidence President Johnson will have to earn himself.

It must be said that he has not yet earned it, and that this Government's reaction to the outbreak of major disorders in the Dominican Republic has done little to reassure those to the south.

Today Latin America is in crisis. Only in Mexico and Chile, and to a lesser extent in Costa Rica, is there real institutional stability, and the future of at least two of those countries is perhaps less certain than present appearances would indicate.

The causes of the crisis are well-known: the revolution of expectations; expanding populations pressing on limited resources; immense population shifts from rural squalor to urban poverty and congestion; invidious class distinctions; serious unemployment and worrisome inflation; inequitable patterns of tax and income distribution; unresponsive and ineffective governments; lack of skilled and responsible political leadership and of adequate institutions for effective popular political participation.

This list is far from exhaustive. But are there not enough items on it to account for massive unrest in Latin America? The turbulence we have seen in the region in the past is likely to pale before the turbulence we shall see during the months and years ahead.

In the absence of out-and-out occupation by our Armed Forces, we cannot exert other than marginal and indirect control over developments in the states of Latin America. With that in mind, what should our policy be as we confront the troubled situation below our borders? In the eyes of the world we are at a clear policy crossroads today, and the world is awaiting our next major decision to see which route we have chosen. The options available to us can be reduced to two.

First, we can conclude, as evidently we did in taking our Dominican actions, that the cold-war risks in this hemisphere have become so great, the capability of Communist elements to take advantage of situations so advanced, and the inability of other Latin American elements to deal with the internal problems of their societies so manifest, that the United States must reexamine its whole relationship to the inter-American system and to the good-neighbor policy that system reflects.

More specifically, we can conclude that the United States must take to itself the right not only unilaterally to determine the existence and nature of Communist threats of takeover of Latin American societies, but also to act unilaterally or preemptively if in our judgment such action is called for to repel those threats. The principles of self-determination, nonintervention and multilateral decisionmaking regrettably may have to take second place from time to time to the exigencies of the cold war. Those principles, of course, will remain operative, but only within limits established by ourselves.

The second option depends upon a sharply different assessment. By this assessment, the conflict between progressive and traditional interests is the dominant problem in Latin America today, and our cold-war engagement with the Communists in the hemisphere is refracted through this prism in the eyes of most politically engaged Latin Americans. They do not, and they will not, see the cold war as we do. Most Latin American societies are in the incipient stages of profound national transformation with attendant disorder and the likelihood of violence (after all, the mold of custom is being broken). But very few Latin Americans participating in the social and political processes now underway foresee—or want to foresee—at the end of their national revolutions a substitution of their former relationship with the United States by a suffocating identification with the Communist world.

What they want is independence, identity, integrity, national dignity, things of which they feel their histories have until now deprived them. What they want is to move into the modern world, but to do so on their own, not on the leading strings of either the United States or the Communist powers. They want to be free to make their own mistakes, to decide their own destinies. They do not want to be Communists nor to see their societies taken over by the Communists; but they take it ill that the United States should presume to tell them what they can and cannot want.

The policy course that one derives from this assessment calls for sensitive understanding of the aspirations that motivate most demands for change in today's Latin America. It calls for a recognition that to equate anti-Americanism with procommunism is much too simple, and that much activity that we regard as being undertaken against our interest is not sparked by the Communists nor being carried out for the purpose of moving the region into the Communist camp.

It also calls for the utmost restraint and the most scrupulous caution on our part in the use of our coercive power. It calls for a show of confidence in the Latin Americans, a willingness to stand in the background and to let them largely on their own

complete their perilous passage to modernity. It calls for a substantial elevation in the status assigned to good-neighbor considerations in the formulation of our decisions, a further development of the Latin American policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, and the evaluation of cold-war threats under the assumptions of good-neighbor premises rather than the reverse.

The risks involved in this second policy are real. We cannot forget our bitter Cuban experience. But we do the Latin Americans small credit by assuming that the lessons of Cuba have been altogether lost upon them. Moreover, we must weigh these risks against the certain consequences of following the first policy. Those consequences include the evisceration of the inter-American system, a sharp reversal in our progress toward inter-American community, the welling up of great resentment toward the United States on the part of most Latin Americans, and a corresponding increase in the appeal of Communist propaganda and agitation.

Further, if we follow this policy, we shall probably have to set up proxy or client regimes in troubled parts of the hemisphere more and more frequently, in violation of legitimate nationalist aspirations, and to commit our own Armed Forces, with the deplorable effects such commitment entails. Neither our own long-term interests nor those of the Latin Americans will be well served if we follow this course.

On the other hand, if we reassign primacy to the philosophy of the good neighbor in our hemispheric dealings, we shall probably see intensified and ever more fruitful efforts by responsible Latin American leaders to work together and with us, across national frontiers, to resolve pressing Latin American problems. Knowing that we will protect them against external threats and will help them upon request to cope with domestic violence and subversion, they will move with greater assurance and optimism to meet the demands of their societies. Knowing that our attitude toward them is benign and constructive, they will assert their independence from us in various ways, experimenting with their freedom. They will increasingly act without us; they will not be acting against us. Over the longer term they will surmount their ingrained fear of us, their nagging sense of inferiority in dealing with us, and will assume their proper roles as self-confident, responsible members of a hemispheric community of which we, too, will be a part.

Surely that is outcome we want to see. Surely the running of some short-term risks is not too high a price to pay for its attainment.

The Late Senator Olin D. Johnston

SPEECH

OF

HON. HAROLD D. COOLEY

OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 22, 1965

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Speaker, for many years I enjoyed the friendship of our late and beloved colleague, OLIN JOHNSTON, who by the simplicity of his life and by his devotion to duty and by his sterling character and great ability endeared himself to his colleagues and to his countrymen. In the golden hours of his great life, he left the shores of sound and moved into the great realm of silence to receive the full reward which his strong faith had purchased. OLIN JOHNSTON was a brave and courageous man, yet he

was an humble and devoted public servant. He was unswerving in his fidelity to truth. He discharged all of the vital functions of high office in a manner which proved him to be worthy of the confidence of the people he so well and ably represented. From an humble beginning through all of the hardships and vicissitudes of life he moved to places of prominence and great responsibility in the public life of his State and Nation. When he left the shores of sound for the great realm of silence, I lost a true and beloved friend, and his State and Nation lost a great statesman. May the Lord of Mercy bless and sustain the members of his family, and may the love and sympathy of his friends soften the sorrow they are now suffering.

The 20th Anniversary of the United Nations

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HERVEY G. MACHEN

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 29, 1965

Mr. MACHEN. Mr. Speaker, on June 26, 1965, the United Nations observed the 20th anniversary of the signing of its charter in San Francisco. On this occasion, I should like to add my voice to those of my colleagues in calling for support of this international Organization. A recent survey revealed that less than 10 percent of American citizens have any extensive knowledge of the United Nations and its work. This is, to say the least, disturbing. The United Nations needs wide public understanding of its activities if it is to have the backing it requires. As a contribution to a better public understanding of the United Nations I discussed the work of this world body in my weekly report to constituents which is being broadcast this week over radio stations throughout Maryland's Fifth District. The following are excerpts of this report:

EXCERPTS OF REPORT TO CONSTITUENTS BY REPRESENTATIVE HERVEY G. MACHEN FOR BROADCAST DURING WEEK OF JUNE 21 TO JULY 2, 1965

It seems to me that before we can intelligently assess the work of the United Nations during the past 20 years, we must recall the purposes for which it was formed. Broadly, these purposes fall into two categories. First, political and diplomatic work aimed directly at the maintenance of peace; and, second, social and economic activities that indirectly promote stable, lasting peace by helping to eliminate the underlying causes of conflict.

The U.N. record of action in both those categories is impressive. In carrying out its peacekeeping function, the United Nations has scored many notable successes.

The U.N. has helped to deter or to terminate warfare in Iran and Greece, in Kashmir and Korea, in the Congo and the Caribbean, and twice in the Middle East and twice in the Western Pacific.

It has settled disputes between countries which could have escalated into world war III.